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Opportunistic decision-making in government: 
concept formation, variety and explanation 
Perri 6 
Abstract 
The notion of opportunism is too often used loosely in policy and administrative research on 
executive decision-making: its various meanings are too rarely clearly distinguished. To make it 
useful for explanation, this article presents fresh concept formation work, clarifying the concept 
to recognise different kinds and degrees of opportunism. To illustrate the use of the refined 
concept, the article examines key decisions by British cabinets and core executives between 1945 
and 1990. It proposes that neo-Durkheimian institutional theory can help to explain why different 
kinds of opportunism are cultivated in differently ordered administrations, so providing new 
insight into decision-making. 
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‘Opportunism’ describes a stance in decision-making. Unfortunately the term is often used loosely 
(Das and Rahman, 2010). Its relationship with an ‘opportunity’ is rarely defined. To exhibit 
explanatory power, greater definitional rigour is needed; varieties must be distinguished. Concept 
formation is a necessary precursor to explanation (Sartori, 1970; Goertz, 2005; 6 and Bellamy, 
2012). For this purpose, this article identifies the concept’s basic elements, using several bodies of 
literature. Examining difficulties in these literatures’ uses lights the way to a more refined 
conception. To illustrate the clarified concept’s usefulness, the article examines British 
governments’ key domestic, economic and foreign policy decisions between 1945 and 1990. The 
final section proposes a neo-Durkheimian institutional account of these decisions, providing new 
insights about distinct forms of opportunism. 
Concepts of opportunism and opportunity 
Uses of the term, ‘opportunism’, can be distinguished by whether they define it by 
i. deficiencies in some normative, moral or ideological commitment;  
or stances toward 
ii. action in particular contingent situations,  
iii. time horizons, or 
iv. potential supporters. 
 
 Among ‘deficiency’ conceptions, Williamson’s (1985, 1993) definition is widely used in political 
economy and in strategic management studies (Besley et al, 2012). It was developed for transaction 
cost analysis of relationships between principals and agents. For Williamson, opportunism means 
self-interest with willingness to use guile, or deliberately giving ‘incomplete or distorted disclosure 
of information, especially [making] calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or 
otherwise confuse’ (1985, 17) in ‘expectation [of] individual advantage’ (1975, 26) at others’ 
expense (Das and Rahman, 2010, 57). Williamson regards opportunism as a constant disposition, 
not a variable, checked only by varying costs, moral education and institutions’ disciplinary effects. 
Some theorists narrow it to mean willingness to defect from agreements (Liu et al, 2010). Others 
emphasise guile so much that opportunism becomes a general disposition to engage in any 
unethical behaviour for gain (Vafaï, 2010). Studying corporate behaviour, Gibbins et al (1990, 130), 
drop Williamson’s condition of guile, stretching opportunism to cover any gain-seeking 
whatsoever. 
 In studying whether governments manipulate economic policy before elections to enhance 
their chances of re-appointment, many political scientists use ‘opportunism’ to mean parties’ 
willingness to present policies as in wider public interests when (presumably knowing that) they 
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are mainly in the party’s interest (Aidt et al, 2001; cf. Elster, 2007, 297). Some studies even allow 
decisions to be opportunistic if the actor cares both about policy outcomes or citizens’ welfare and 
their own re-election (Rogoff, 1990; Walter, 2008, 372). Sometimes opportunism is used to 
describe decisionmaking deficient, not in altruistic or moral but in ideological principle (Brass, 
1977; van Dalen and Swank, 1996). 
 Other political scientists use the term to mean merely being astute to contingencies, to take 
advantage of opportunities (Jasiewicz, 2008; Messina, 2001). 
 Developing Kingdon’s (1995 [1984]) multiple streams framework, Weissert (1991) and Ugur 
and Yankaya (2008) distinguish persistent policy entrepreneurs prepared to wait for better 
opportunities from policy opportunists who do not persist beyond one political cycle (e.g., an 
administration). On this view, foreshortened time horizons are key. 
 Finally, some studies on populism use opportunism to mean ‘(quickly) pleasing the 
people/voters – and so ‘buying’ their support’ (Mudde, 2004, 542). 
 Sometimes, these senses are combined. Thus Krause et al (2013, 275) combine deficiency in 
ideological principle with short-termism, defining opportunism as ‘short-term political expediency 
at the expense of long-run sound policy judgment’. Nevertheless, lack of principled commitment, 
orientation to contingency, short time horizon and materially rewarding supporters with low cost 
but high profile measures vary independently of each other. Short-termists may be honest, even 
principled; rogues may be patient; measures chosen for short term considerations can be 
unpopular with potential supporters; rogues and short-termist but decent politicians alike may be 
poor opportunity-spotters. 
 Any researcher may define ‘opportunism’ as they require, provided their usage is consistent 
and exhibits construct validity – i.e., it should capture both underlying common meanings and the 
research purpose. Defining opportunism as ideologically unprincipled decisionmaking fails this 
standard. For example, the Bolshevik party was highly ideologically driven in 1917. Yet it made 
decisions readily described as opportunistic in respects of guile and astuteness to contingency, but 
which were neither wholly crowd-pleasing nor short termist even when rushed. In response to the 
Provisional Government’s threat to suppress the party and to Kornilov’s attempted military coup, 
Lenin used German (enemy) support to return to Russia; the party exploited strikes, which it had 
not stimulated, against the government; finally, it overthrew the weakened government in a coup. 
Thus, defining it by a focus on the immediate time horizon, although appropriate to Bolshevik 
decision-makers’ assessment of the moment to strike, must be qualified to allow that seizing the 
day may be done opportunistically in pursuit of a principled goal and for longer term planning 
horizons. 
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 Lacking orientation to contingent opportunities, Williamson’s category of guile or other 
unethical behaviour is not appropriately described as opportunistic. This would leave spur-of-the-
moment crime indistinguishable from careful long-term building of large criminal empires, as 
though the petty thief’s decision-making, seeing an open window, were no different from the 
Godfather’s. Likewise, seeking popularity by offering advantages is not distinctively opportunistic, 
without one or more of the other strands. 
 For the second strand to be helpful, then, a valid concept of opportunism must rest on a clear 
definition of an ‘opportunity’. In Kingdon’s (1995 [1984], 166-72) ‘multiple streams’ account of 
policymaking, opportunities are occasions in relationships among circumstances, advocates and 
policy proposals, when actors’ difficulties in pressing proposals are reduced. Unfortunately, this 
lacks precision. Elster (2007, 165) defines an opportunity as any feasible action. But this takes no 
account of desires. Life is full of things we could do, but have no wish to. It is odd to describe as 
opportunities, circumstances which only provide chances for doing things in which we have no 
interest. Elster (2007, 170) claims, without evidence, that opportunities are easier to change than 
desires, despite defining opportunities as what remains after constraints filter infeasible actions. 
Many constraints on opportunities are very difficult to change. Yet he also acknowledges that 
opportunities endogenously influence desires. Defining opportunities as feasible sets of available 
actions makes them necessary but insufficient conditions for taking actions. But this is no 
explanation: it says only that if the thing was done, it must have been possible. 
  Some scholars draw upon an influential criminological theory for the opposite view of 
opportunity from Kingdon’s. Clarke’s and Mayhew’s (1989) study of falling British suicide rates 
after conversion from coal gas to North Sea gas argued that closing an opportunity to kill 
themselves by one means led people to reappraise their desire to kill themselves at all. Generalising 
from this, ‘routine activities’ theory (e.g., Felson, 2002) claims that ‘opportunity makes the 
criminal’. Dispositions are therefore endogenous to opportunities, objectively defined. Crimes are 
explained by coincidences of motivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence of capable 
guardians (in political decisions, perhaps motivated ministers, suitable policy targets and no capable 
opponents). That theory regards offenders’ motivations as general dispositions, only converted 
into intentions to commit particular offences when opportunities arise. This returns us to 
Williamson’s general disposition and willingness to breach norms. Opportunities consist in the 
absence of capable guardians and availability of suitable targets. 
 Sutton (2012ab) shows that as with Elster’s account, the claim is true by definition, but it is 
not an explanation. If an offence has been committed, then the guardian (opponent) must have 
been incapable of preventing it, the target must have been available and the offender (ministers) 
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must have had motivation. Defining guardians’ capabilities and targets’ suitability by objective 
features alone is insufficient. The theory takes offenders’ perception of guardians’ capability and 
targets’ suitability for granted or treats them as irrelevant. Endogeneity of intentions to objective 
opportunities is not explained. Objective features of targets and guardians can only be necessary, 
not sufficient conditions for explaining decisions to commit crimes. Without account of types of 
motivations and of perceptions, opportunism has no content. Opportunity alone provides no 
distinctive explanation for particular decisions. 
 This examination of influential frameworks suggests eight standards for a definition. 
Opportunism must be defined 
 
- as a stance defined in relation to opportunities, meaning contingent events, not structural 
conditions; 
- including actors’ perceptions of circumstances; 
- defined by stances toward relative gains and risks, to time discounting, and for a given 
actor’s desires; 
- as a variable not a constant; 
- recognising that actors are differently biased in perceiving the presence, salience, relevance, 
probability and size of gains from circumstances; 
- recognising a spectrum of willingness to search for and invest in creating opportunities; 
- allowing for ideological motivations; and 
- without assuming unethical behaviour. 
 
 The following definitions meet these standards. An opportunity is 
 
a contingency C (an occasion, event or short term condition, relative to the actor’s 
decision-making horizon) which raises the probability P for an actor A, in an action X, of 
securing a gain G which has some appeal for A’s desires, and which offers lower costs or 
risks R than the actor might envisage or expect in the absence of the type of contingency 
C is. 
 
 A’s X-ing in C does not make A an opportunist, only an opportunity-taker in C. For someone’s 
manner of taking opportunities to be genuinely opportunistic, the argument above implies, as well as  
- perceiving and being willing to seize an opportunity, their decision-making must also 
exhibit 
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- discounting time to focus on the short term and 
- preferring readily or cheaply available gains over potentially greater long term gains 
are defining conditions. 
 This definition recognises degrees of discounting and differences in perceptions of 
probabilities, costs and gains. Thus, a scalar concept of opportunism is more appropriate than a 
classical one (Goertz, 2005; 6 and Bellamy, 2012) for explaining executive decision-making. This 
suggests that four cognitive and conative dimensions of depth of opportunism are required. 
Decision-makers’ opportunism may vary with respect to their 
 
- time horizon and discounting the future; 
- the costs which they are willing to bear in finding or creating opportunities; 
- willingness to accept different kinds of gains because they are available in the short term, 
cheaply or with high probability, and in their 
- biased perceptions of probabilities and sizes of gains. 
 
 Nonetheless, many imperatives and relationships affecting one dimension would likely affect 
others too. 
 Opportunism is deeper where actors are oriented to the short term, discount heavily, will bear 
few costs, and/or exaggerate probabilities and sizes of gains. Opportunism with respect to 
probability of gains could be argued to be deeper than opportunism with respect to their size. 
Someone prepared to forego chances of great gain for certainty of modest gain could be described 
as more deeply opportunistic than someone whose biases merely misled them into supposing that 
a modest gain is bigger than it really is. In stances toward cost, we can distinguish three degrees: 
 
a. Casual opportunism by encounter without search or investment: deep opportunism with 
respect to cost – the opportunity arises from causes largely independent of the actor’s 
previous decisions, and actors can recognise the opportunity without having sought it out 
(e.g., an unexpected economic windfall or electoral success); 
b. Search opportunism: moderately deep opportunism with respect to cost – the opportunity arises 
from causes largely independent of the actor’s previous decisions, but the actor had 
invested resources in putting herself / himself in a position to recognise opportunities if 
they arose (e.g., some resources were fortunately available; some monitoring capability was 
maintained, even if inadvertently); and 
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c. Limited investment opportunism: shallow opportunism with respect to cost – the opportunity 
arises from causes to which the actor’s previous decisions made a significant causal 
contribution (e.g., deliberately maintaining contacts). 
 
 Opportunism is not the only case of over-perceiving probabilities or sizes of gains from 
opportunities. People who eschew opportunism may exhibit highly tuned appreciation of the 
presence of opportunities they reject. Principled free marketeers may be fastidious in recognising 
even hints of non-tariff barriers; the virtuous may measure their performance by their sensitivity 
to temptations for vices they shun. Finally, opportunists may be disappointed, because they may 
err about costs, sizes or probabilities of gain. No assumption is implied about whether, typically, 
opportunistic decisions are normatively right or wrong, or adroitly chosen or competently 
executed. 
Illustration 
To illustrate the argument for theory development only, we consider how far British postwar 
governments have exhibited these degrees of opportunism, in domestic economic policy – such 
as short term expansion when opportunities seemed to permit, but risking longer term inflation – 
and in foreign policy – such as seizing opportunities for high profile and dramatic initiatives with 
hope (not necessarily achieved) of short term success but risking longer term failure. (Excluded, 
because the present study concerns substantive policy decisions, are prime ministers’ decisions on 
timings of general elections.) 
 Taken from a much larger study of political judgement in the period, Table 1 has been 
constructed by coding decisions using diaries, memoirs, biographies and secondary historical 
works, archived ministerial private papers and official papers in the National Archives. There is 
not space to present coding for all major decisions taken by each government. However, the table 
identifies key economic, foreign and other political decisions which can be regarded as 
opportunistic as defined above. 
 At this stage, we focus on the third column, showing how the scalar concept can be used to 
distinguish absence of opportunism and its three degrees. For example, there is little evidence in 
the Attlee administration of decisions showing economic short-termism. On the contrary, the 
welfare state programmes were expensive to establish and would not yield major gains for years, 
while the major foreign policy initiatives in decolonisation were unpopular at home and risky in 
the middle east and subcontinent, but undertaken in significant part for principled reasons. By 
contrast, Eden’s government clearly exhibited significant casual opportunism. Chancellor 
Macmillan’s premium bond initiative was a headline-catching way of raising cash and involved 
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little search. Eden’s decision to leap upon the secret Israeli offer to assist with the Suez crisis again 
involved little search and showed – for an experienced former foreign secretary – astonishingly 
little concern for possible medium term consequences. Longer lasting governments exhibited 
either significant changes in degree of opportunism or differences in the distribution of degrees of 
opportunism among policy fields. Before 1961, for example, (despite claiming in his memoirs 
always to have been an expansionist) Macmillan’s own administration showed little opportunism 
in economic policy: ministers undertook unpopular deflation for longer term gains and faced down 
major strikes which had significant public support. Yet there is evidence of searching for 
opportunities for short-term grandstanding in areas of foreign affairs in Macmillan’s own preserve, 
as shown in his Moscow visit and his shameless exploitation of Eisenhower’s state visit in 1959. 
Macmillan’s hopes of finding an early opportunity to impress the newly elected US President 
Kennedy before his foreign policy became settled show all the features of limited investment 
opportunism. By contrast, after 1961-2, opportunistic economic short-termism began to grow, 
shown not only in Maudling’s ‘dash for growth’ but in Macmillan’s guileful manipulation of pay 
negotiations, his failure to back junior ministers who executed his own policies, and pressing for a 
chance to be present at what was really a US achievement in the partial test ban treaty (6, 2015b).  
 The table summarises changes and contrasts for the full set of governments in the period. 
[Table 1] 
Toward theory-based explanation 
What might explain these differences in degrees to which these governments exhibit different 
kinds of opportunism in particular policy fields? When might decision-makers regard it as 
intelligent to value short term or readily available gains above longer term or chancier ones? When 
might they persuade themselves that available gains are greater or more likely than more 
dispassionate observers might believe? 
 As formal features compatible with various substantive ideologies, stances toward cost, risk, 
time and contingent events are parts of ‘thought style’ (Douglas, 1986) – or, in government, of 
style in political judgement (6, 2011, 2014a). Therefore, neo-Durkheimian institutional theory of 
stylistic features of judgement, (Douglas 1982; Thompson et al, 1990; Hood, 1998; 6, 2011, 2014ab) 
is an especially promising source of hypotheses: the present argument comprehensively recasts 
Douglas’ (1992, 198-204) suggested explanation for variations in degrees and forms of 
opportunism. 
 Durkheimian approaches argue that thought styles should be explained, not by personality, but 
by informal institutions governing patterns of social relations (Durkheim 1995, Durkheim and 
Mauss, 1963; 6, 2011, 2014a). People project formal features of their institutions onto their 
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problems, preferences, etc. We order our world as we ourselves are socially ordered. Explaining 
opportunistic decision-making in governments therefore requires attention to informal institutions 
shaping relations among ministers, advisers and senior civil servants within core executives. 
 The framework derives its typology of informal institutions by cross-tabulating (Douglas, 
1982) Durkheim’s (1951) two universal dimensions of variation in elementary forms of institutions. 
‘Social regulation’ measures the extent to which life within (here) a governing executive (ministers 
and their closest political and civil service advisers) is ordered by informal institutions of constraint, 
imperative, and control of authorisations to act, or conversely by discretion and scope for choice. 
With weak social regulation, discretion is considerable; arrangements are open to fluid negotiation. 
‘Social integration’ measures the degree to which arrangements are ordered by a bounded group, 
clearly distinguishing members from the detached. Cross-tabulating these dimensions yields four 
elementary forms of institutions (Douglas, 1982) – hierarchical (strong social regulation and 
integration), individualistic (weak social regulation and integration), enclaved (strong social 
integration, weak external regulation and internal regulation only as strong as can be accepted 
without weakening integration or requiring external institutional buttress: Rayner, 1988); and 
isolate ordering (strong social regulation, weak social integration). The neo-Durkheimian argument 
is that biases in thought styles will exhibit as much or as little regulation and integration as people 
are subject to social regulation and social integration in relations with those with whom they deal 
most intensely in that part of their life or work (Douglas, 1982; 6, 2011, 2014a).  
 The framework predicts that most empirical settings will exhibit a mix of these elementary 
forms, because each develops in positive feedback, as people react with countervailing or negative 
feedback to assertions in other forms (Thompson, 2008; 6, 2003). When positive feedback in one 
form produces institutional disorganisation or disadvantage, losers can only reach for another form 
by which to organise. Both provisional settlements and conflicts among elementary forms are 
expected, depending on their relative weight and the depth of positive and negative feedback 
among them. The framework therefore predicts dynamic institutional disequilibrium (Thompson, 
2008). In cross-sectional studies, though, shifting patterns of settlement and tension show up only 
as weighted mixes of forms, in which one or two are dominant when data are collected. 
 The remainder of this section summarises hypotheses derived from the framework about 
forms of opportunism. 
 Thought styles are sensitive to risks threatening their peculiar institutions (Douglas, 1992). 
Therefore, where they cultivate types of opportunism, institutional forms selectively preserve their 
own structures at the expense of others’ (Douglas, 1982). 
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 When strong integration accompanies strong regulation, opportunism is not cultivated in any 
dimension. Strong bonds and marking of boundaries are sustained between those within the zone 
of social integration and those outside it, together with rule-based systems of authorisation to act. 
This is hierarchy, but in not the common usage of the word, where it typically means just any 
inequality or simple command. Simple authoritarian command is inconsistent with the legitimation 
and rule-based authorisation which sustain strong integration: 6, 2015a. Moreover, each of the four 
elementary forms generates its peculiar pattern of inequality. 
 Irrespective of whether or not more opportunities arise than adversities, heavy discounting of 
future gains makes little sense in hierarchy. This is because rule-based authorisation and constraint 
reduce perceptions of uncertainty among both superiors and subalterns, and institutions prescribe 
actions to sustain the integrated community into a future conceived in long time horizons. 
 Where social integration is strong but prescribed regulation is weak, leaving only such 
regulation as can be collectively, voluntarily agreed, a strong sense of accountability to the past is 
cultivated within the enclaved group (Rayner, 1982, 1988). Lacking authority and individual 
incentive, only shared beliefs on heavily bounded matters of principle can sustain cohesion. 
Therefore, a heavily marked boundary is cultivated around believing group members. Yet current 
dependence on collective agreement for action leads to an open sense of the future, if people act 
together. Great urgency is cultivated to reinforce it (Rayner, 1982; Peck and 6, 2006). The impact 
upon opportunism is therefore conflicted. Principled commitment excludes most kinds of 
opportunism. The drastic action to which enclaves are committed is usually driven by the opposite 
of opportunism – a willingness to accept short term losses in pursuit of long term gains. Indeed 
in deep positive feedback, members of enclaved groups may prefer to sacrifice their own lives 
together than to surrender principle (Douglas, 1982; Durkheim, 1951). However, in moderate 
positive feedback but still in perceived adversity or crisis – a frequently perceived condition 
because crisis reinforces solidarity – justification is readily found for drastic action to secure the 
enclaved group’s survival, as necessary to ensure that its principles endure. Opportunistic action 
may be justified by arguments that different principles are appropriate for imposing costs and 
losses on non-members than would be acceptable for members themselves. This was the case for 
the embattled Bolsheviks facing suppression, had the Provisional Government regrouped. 
Needing to justify action by principle can limit the scope for opportunism without a current 
existential threat. Where opportunism arises in an enclave under perceived existential threat, we 
expect exaggerated perception of the size of gains, rather than of their probability. For when group 
survival is important only as a way of securing survival for its principles, probabilities of gains to 
the group matter less than faith in those principles. In enclaved settings, we expect shallower 
  11 
opportunism with respect to cost than elsewhere, because when survival of group principles is key, 
limited investment opportunism might be justified but casual opportunism is insufficient to meet 
standards of principled action. Here, therefore, a limited style of opportunism arises, not when 
events deliver objective opportunities but instead when the worst adversities arise. 
 Where both social regulation and integration are weak, discretion and weak bonds allow 
individuals to secure organisation, using negotiations involving incentive, exchange and reward. 
No stable boundary marks any fixed identities. Some readers might expect individualistic 
institutions to cultivate deep opportunism, but careful reasoning shows that this expectation 
requires heavy qualification. True, under individualistic institutions it is difficult to negotiate 
arrangements for such long periods as can be achieved with authoritative legitimation under 
hierarchical ones. Yet structures of offsetting incentives can be assembled and negotiated 
(Stinchcombe and Heimer, 1985) to cultivate medium-term planning horizons sufficient for 
willingness to invest and to bear short term costs for medium term gain. A common form of 
individualistic ordering, especially important in governments, is the patron-client relation. An 
independent patron gathers a ‘claque’ of dependent followers (by contrast with enclaved ‘cliques’) 
by offering expectation of future reward under generalised exchange. Those forms of opportunism 
which risk a patron’s base of support by demonstrating untrustworthiness are less likely than those 
which enhance it, casually or by search. These capacities cultivate a thought style biased to 
exaggerate probabilities of gains more than their size, because successfully preserving an 
independent patron’s position over the medium term depends on cultivating shrewd assessments 
of sizes of gains, although each individual will learn from mistakes. Because relations are negotiated 
among rival patrons (e.g., powerful ministers) from unequal power bases and also between patrons 
and clients, individualistic institutions allow search and limited investment opportunism, not only 
exploitation of found opportunities. When events deliver few opportunities but many adversities 
to individualistically ordered decision-makers, their scope for discretion exaggerates perceived 
probabilities of future opportunities, so cultivating a resilient thought style. 
 Where social regulation is strong but integration is weak, thin bonds to others and lack of 
articulated capacity or incentive for agreement make collective action difficult. Whatever resources 
they hold, strong constraint without integrated legitimation leaves people coping with adversities 
by power rather than authority or exchange, and in deep uncertainty about the future. This context 
is therefore described as isolate ordering (Douglas, 1996). Individuals who can hold onto resources 
or high office for a period might cope by passing on constraints to others by imposition; this 
position is known as structurally despotic (Coyle, 1994; 6, 2011, 2014ab, 2015b). Those who cannot 
pass on constraints must either evade them (perhaps violating norms), or else accept them and any 
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consequent losses. When frustrated by failures to impose or pass on constraints, those in 
structurally despotic positions will lapse into these structural serf positions.  
 Under isolate ordering, we therefore expect opportunism, where it arises, to be deepest with 
respect to time and cost. For weak bonds and strong constraints leave people able only to work 
with very short term horizons, and unwilling to take great investment for a future over which 
prevailing institutions afford limited control. Deep opportunism in time and cost therefore appears 
reasonable. Deep uncertainty about the future, however, mitigates against exaggerated perception 
of probability of gains, for similar reasons to those exhibited under individualistic institutions. 
Instead isolate ordering is likely to cultivate exaggerated perception of the sizes of gains. This 
motivates improvising coping action under strong constraint, together with a shrewd recognition 
that big chances may have to be taken. Therefore in this setting, the expectation generated by 
prospect theory, of great risk taking in the domain of losses, is most likely to be exhibited, but it is 
not a general phenomenon, irrespective of institutional forms. 
 Two important qualifications arise to the hypothesis about isolate ordering. For all its 
vulnerability to being reduced to the structural serf position (because fallback options are limited: 
6, 2015b), a structurally despotic position is nevertheless a more advantageous position than that 
of a structural serf. Someone trying to maintain a despotic position must consider how far, if 
constraints and weak bonds allow, to devote resources to searching for, or putting investment into 
creating opportunities. However, strong constraints limit both levels of investment and numbers 
of policy fields in which structural despots will find search or investment worthwhile. In the 
domain of gains, this may curb opportunism with respect to cost, and cultivate shrewd assessments 
of expected gains from imposition and confrontation (6, 2011). 
 The second qualification arises where isolates face few objective opportunities but experience 
many adversities. Sustaining exaggerated perception of the probability of opportunities (the ‘Jacques 
le fataliste’ or ‘Mr Micawber’ mode) requires some objective opportunities. Even in isolate ordering, 
it is hard to sustain when experience delivers adversities more consistently than opportunities 
(Thompson et al, 1990). Lacking strong bonds or strong discretion to sustain optimism, the 
opposite bias can arise, whereby opportunities are under-perceived. In either isolate register, 
decision-making is based on coping and improvisation. But improvisation does not consist in 
search for opportunities, but in coping despite their perceived unavailability. 
 Table Two summarises the hypotheses. It shows that the deepest opportunism is expected in 
weak social integration, but acknowledges the special conditions of perceived existential threat in 
which particular kinds of opportunism can be cultivated in moderately strong enclaving. 
[Table Two] 
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Illustrative evidence for the theory 
Table One’s final column shows each administration’s informal social organisation in each period. 
Dates defining rows reflect times when informal institutional forms shifted, not general election 
years. 
 Governments of the late 1940s and early 1950s were predominantly hierarchical; this form was 
less heavily marked after 1953. Many governments shifted from their initial ordering toward isolate 
institutions either quickly (Eden’s almost immediately in 1955, Heath’s markedly after February 
1972) or in their later years (Macmillan’s from 1961-2, Callaghan’s from 1978 and Thatcher’s by 
1985). Most governments which moved into isolate ordering did not exit from it. Only Wilson’s 
second 1960s administration moved back, after a brief and shallow ‘isolation dynamic’ (November 
1967-April 1968) to its initially predominantly individualistic form (6, 2015b).  
 The findings provide considerable support for the hypotheses. Space permits examination of 
only a selection of decisions identified in Table One. 
 As predicted, the largely hierarchical governments of the 1940s and early 1950s exhibit little 
opportunism. On the contrary, Attlee’s first government shows the most extreme cases of 
willingness to bear short and medium term costs in pursuit of long term construction of formal 
institutions to stabilise the domestic economy through the welfare state, land use planning and 
housing investment and the international order through NATO and decolonisation. Churchill’s 
only slightly less hierarchical administration shows the first signs of opportunism in the 
individualistic register from ministers on the hierarchy’s periphery, such as housing minister 
Harold Macmillan who personalised his spending programme, as a negotiating stratagem with the 
Treasury (and for career building). 
 The one case of significant enclaving is the monetarist circle around Mrs Thatcher in her first 
government and in the first half of her second administration (Campbell, 2003), although this was 
moderated by some hierarchical ordering in the rest of the administration. Because the enclave 
neither faced nor perceived any existential threat, that type of opportunism was not cultivated. 
There is little evidence of opportunism in economic policy during the early to mid-1980s. Indeed, 
commitment to principle led ministers to bear huge short term costs in unemployment and 
unpopularity especially after the pro-cyclical 1981 budget during the downturn. The combination 
of enclaved and hierarchical cohesion enabled the government to make costly short term 
concessions to the National Union of Miners in 1980-1 while making medium term preparations 
for a full confrontation a few years later. 
 The framework expects that in individualistically ordered governments opportunism will focus 
most on opportunities for personal glory or on negotiating opportunities. Macmillan operated as 
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sole patron in a zone of individualistic ordering in superpower relations in 1957-1963. As we 
expect, this sustained grandstanding and negotiation-oriented over-estimation of gains in his 
Moscow trip in 1959, in capitalising on public outrage about South African repression in 1960, in 
opportunistic personal publicity seeking in globe-trotting summitry and in pursuing a presence at 
superpower conferences. Wilson’s strongly individualistic 1960s administrations show significantly 
personalised, grandstanding and negotiation-based opportunism. This can be seen in Wilson’s 
1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ mission, which sought to bring about negotiations for de-
escalation in the Vietnam war. Wilson seized on circumstances to act for short term political 
advantage, without expecting the mission to succeed in its overt aim. By contrast, in 1967 his hopes 
for success in securing a breakthrough over Vietnam were sincerely held. When Soviet Premier 
Kosygin visited London in February, Wilson – believing his own negotiating skills sufficient – 
exaggerated estimations of the chances of a breakthrough. This led him opportunistically to act 
without full clearance from the White House: opportunistic action is not necessarily adroitly 
chosen. In competition with other ministerial patrons, Wilson often used crises for personal 
grandstanding, as when he dramatically used secret intelligence to name individual shop stewards 
in the striking seamen’s union as communists in 1966. 
 As the framework predicts, governments under isolate ordering exhibit the greatest variety of 
types of opportunism. Where a premier achieves a structurally despotic position, he or she would 
use imposition opportunistically. Thus, Eden exhibited a coercive style of opportunism in seizing 
on the secret French plan for an Israeli feint into Sinai as an excuse for Anglo-French intervention 
around the Suez Canal and then misled the Commons about it. In domestic policy, by contrast, 
where Eden did not dominate his own government, the administration’s concessions in 1955 to 
several trades unions show the loss acceptance expected of an isolate government in structural serf 
ordering. 
 The Heath government shows another category of bias about opportunity predicted in isolate 
ordering. That administration tended to respond to adversities by seeking first to impose rules 
such as the Industrial Relations Act control, the ‘N minus one’ incomes policy in 1971-2 and then 
the Phase III scheme in 1973-4. Yet, by the time it had slipped deeply into isolate ordering, when 
faced with confrontation powerful by enclaved groups including trades unions and when moving 
from despotic to structural serf position, the government combined under-perceiving opportunities 
with opportunistic coping in accepting losses. For example, during the second miners’ strike, the 
government rejected a TUC offer out of hand which could have provided a settlement which 
might have saved the government’s face more effectively than, in desperation, establishing an 
inquiry which was sure to grant a generous pay increase and also announcing a general election.  
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 Wilson’s 1974-6 government provides a distinctive configuration, in which an increasingly 
isolate premier sought to hold together a government divided into two enclaves engaged in a 
standoff over Europe. The decision to announce a referendum on remaining in the European 
‘common market’ provided a stopgap solution and perhaps more. To both enclaves, it carried 
appeal to democratic principle, although it offended purist allegiance to representative democracy 
and parliamentary sovereignty. The decision first to re-negotiate the terms of Britain’s membership 
showed Wilson adroitly searching for short term opportunities from a position of considerable 
weakness within the government, because it enabled modest changes secured by Callaghan to be 
presented as major achievements. Callaghan’s own government was initially hierarchically ordered 
in 1976 (Morgan, 1997, 485-522). Yet by 1978, Callaghan’s over-riding of his chancellor’s policy 
to demand an unattainable 5% wage norm showed the extent to which an increasingly isolated 
premier now sought a more structurally despotic role. The 1978 gamble of postponing the election 
reflected, not shallow opportunism (which would have suggested calling an election on short term 
currents in public opinion) but limited investment opportunism gambling on a policy success, from 
a position in the domain of losses identified by prospect theory and from the isolate institutional 
location which that framework describes (but does not explain variation in stances in the domain 
of losses as the neo-Durkheimian argument seeks to do). 
 Mrs Thatcher’s government exhibited limited opportunism, even after the monetarist enclave 
declined (but some cases of force majeure and many of populism). However, relations between isolate 
and enclaved ordering became important in the late 1980s. In these later years, as she came to 
occupy a structurally isolate position, Mrs Thatcher’s Bruges speech and other increasingly 
Eurosceptic interventions capitalised on currents in Conservative opinion, appealing to an enclave 
which had grown within the party since Heath’s time. Weak cohesion between the PM and 
Chancellor Lawson left Lawson accepting international pressure to accept constraint in shadowing 
the Deutschmark. What appeared initially to be hierarchical principle soon turned out to be a short 
term coping measure: as inflation soared, the brief boom ended. These interventions further 
weakened cohesion among ministers, already at odds over macro-economic policy, local 
government taxation and other issues. 
Conclusion 
Although too often used loosely and carrying too much accusatory freight to sustain explanation, 
the notion of opportunism can be rigorously redefined, used for coding cases and for supporting 
explanatory theories of executive decision-making. The framework offered here presents clear 
relationships between opportunism and contingent events and testable hypotheses about the 
variation expected in styles and dimensions. It defines opportunism on dimensions of time 
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discounting, costs and biased perceptions of probability and size of gains. The article argues for 
using a scalar rather than a classical concept to capture differences in degree that matter for 
explanation. Three degrees of opportunism – casual, search and investment – have been 
distinguished by differences on dimensions of stances toward cost and gain. The argument shows 
that greater explanatory power is achieved by treating opportunism as a variable rather than as a 
constant. 
 This article uses data from a study of political judgement in postwar British governments to 
illustrate how theory development can use the refined concept of opportunism. To develop 
plausible explanations of variation in opportunism which are worth examining in future research, 
we need theories specifying conditions for cultivating contrasting biases. The neo-Durkheimian 
institutional framework argues that actors’ contrasting stances toward short term opportunities, 
potential future gains and losses, styles of rationality and risk appetite are endogenous to informal 
institutions of their social organisation. Each stance exhibits an intelligent strategy under peculiar 
institutions. Although the theory weights and explains perceptions, it is no subjectivist account. 
Contingent events create and destroy opportunities, irrespective of actors’ biased perceptions. 
Moreover, responses from media, interest and pressure groups and wider publics shape the 
adversities and anomalies that governments experience when they seek to take, or eschew, what 
they regard as opportunities. 
 Opportunism is too rich and valuable an idea to be left as a vague accusation. This article 
argues that it can be rescued and used in powerful explanatory work to yield new insights about 
subtly important differences in styles of executive decision-making. 
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Table One. Degrees of opportunism and informal institutions in British governments, 
1945-1990 
 
Period Prime minister 
and party in 
government 
Cases showing evidence of degrees of opportunism Informal institutions of 
social organisation in 
cabinet and core executive 
1945-49 Attlee, 
Labour 
None. Major domestic decisions were long 
term ones in welfare, or emergency 
responses driven by pursuit of stabilisation 
(December 1945 loans, Marshall Aid, fuel 
rationing in 1947 crisis, 1949 devaluation). 
Foreign policy driven by long term aims of 
settlement in India and Israel-Palestine, 
institution building for western alliance. 
Hierarchical; shallow 
isolate phase in 1947 
when weak oversight 
of Ministry of Fuel and 
Power shows hierarchy 
temporarily weakening; 
then recrudescent 
afterward 
1949-51 Attlee, 
Labour 
Few in government policy, though Bevan’s 
grandstanding could be individual (not yet 
a faction) search opportunism, looking for 
occasion on which to make a stand against 
Treasury policy  
 
Hierarchical, but 
weakening in favour of 
individualism / isolate 
1951-53 Churchill, 
Conservative 
Few significant cases 
Macmillan, on periphery of hierarchical 
system in cabinet, as housing minister 
engaged in some personal search 
opportunism, grandstanding over housing 
expenditure, initially as investment to 
create opportunities in budget negotiations 
with Butler but also with medium term 
aspirations for his career 
Hierarchical: some 
individualistic ordering 
among less senior 
ministers 
1953-55 Churchill, 
Conservative 
Butler’s expansionist budgets show some 
evidence of casual electoral opportunism, 
and inference from short-term economic 
trends 
Isolate increasingly 
significant; no 
structural despot 
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1955-57 Eden, 
Conservative 
Significant casual opportunism 
Macmillan’s ‘premium bonds’ scheme 
Eden and Monckton’s rapid settlement 
with striking unions to secure industrial 
peace in 55-6, even at price of inflationary 
pressures and encouraging unions to press 
demands in future 
Casual / search opportunism over Suez: 
Eden seizing upon French-Israeli plan  
Isolate very significant; 
Eden as structurally 
despotic figure, 
especially in foreign 
policy; 
1957-
61/2 
Macmillan, 
Conservative 
Little evidence in domestic policy 
Foreign affairs: Search opportunism in 1959 
visit to Moscow, casual opportunism 
exploiting Eisenhower’s state visit for 
election campaign 1959; search and limited 
investment opportunism in looking for 
negotiating opportunity with Kennedy 
quickly after arrival in White House 
Hierarchical, with zone 
of individualistic 
organisation in foreign 
affairs, with reserved 
zone for PM 
1961/2-
63 
Macmillan, 
Conservative 
More significant casual opportunism 
1962: Failure to back blameless junior 
minister and prosecution of journalists for 
refusing to reveal sources about Vassall spy 
case, secured short term popularity with 
Tory right at expense longer term goodwill 
from press for government 
1962-3 Maudling ‘dash for growth’ justified 
on basis of short-term economic figures 
1963 government support for law to allow 
peers to disclaim and seek election in 
Commons, initially to benefit Hailsham 
1963 Polaris deal to exploit Kennedy’s 
goodwill after Skybolt debacle; then riding 
on tail of US to secure place at Partial Test 
Ban Treaty 
Isolate increasingly 
significant; Macmillan’s 
drift toward 
structurally despotic 
figure checked and 
reversed by reception 
of July 1962 reshuffle 
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1963-64 Douglas-
Home, 
Conservative 
Home’s misjudged search opportunism in 
talks with Johnson 
Maudling continued search opportunism in 
‘dash for growth’ 
Individualism more 
significant: PM needs 
to negotiate to secure 
ministers willing to 
serve 
1964-67 Wilson, 
Labour 
Limited opportunism in economic policy 
as deal among leading figures held to 
discipline policy around dollar exchange 
rate 
Series of cases of casual opportunism 
especially associated with PM individually 
1965 Vietnam initiatives 
1966 Seamen’s strike, use in House of 
Commons of intelligence information to 
name communists in NUS 
D Notice affair 
Tiger talks 
Individualistic, with 
tight voluntary alliance 
among leading patrons 
voluntarily to accept 
external constraint 
Novem
ber 
1967- 
April 68 
Wilson, 
Labour 
More cases of casual opportunism, after 
devaluation setback 
Response to King ‘coup’ 
Accepting Brown’s resignation 
Short, shallow, mild 
period of isolate 
ordering; dissipated 
March-April 1968 
1968-70 Wilson, 
Labour 
Less significant opportunism in 
government policy generally as deal among 
leading figures sustained tight Treasury 
discipline from January 1968 budget 
Search opportunism: Fearless talks 
Casual opportunism: Anguilla operation 
Individualistic, with 
tight voluntary alliance 
among leading patrons 
voluntarily to accept 
external constraint 
1970-
1/2 
Heath, 
Conservative 
Very limited number of cases of 
opportunism, and mainly search or limited 
investment: East Asia and Five Power 
Defence Agreement showed tokenism 
Hierarchical but 
growing isolate 
ordering 
1972-4 Heath, 
Conservative 
More improvisation than opportunism, 
because government faced more adversities 
than opportunities – ‘U turns’ in prices and 
Very strongly isolate, 
and becoming more so; 
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incomes policy, rescue nationalisation and 
industry policy 
Bias: reduced perception of opportunity 
Heath as structurally 
despotic figure 
1974-6 Wilson, 
Labour 
Strong casual opportunism: referendum 
decision, as solution to a dilemma created 
by need to contain conflict between rival 
enclaved groups in government 
Isolate PM and 
chancellor; cabinet 
otherwise split in two 
or more enclaves 
1976-79 Callaghan, 
Labour 
Search opportunism: Callaghan’s 1978 
gamble on late election together with a 
final over-ambitious attempt to seek a 5% 
wage increase norm rejected one potential 
opportunity perceived by others, not by 
Callaghan, in favour of another 
(mis)perceived one for a possible 
agreement with the trades unions which 
was unattainable. 
Initial hierarchy, giving 
way to isolate PM and 
chancellor; cabinet 
otherwise split in two 
or more enclaves; 
tension between 
Healey and Callaghan 
for structurally 
despotic position, with 
increasing difficulty 
vis-a-vis enclaves 
1979-84 Thatcher, 
Conservative 
None Enclave around PM 
and, initially, 
Chancellor 
1984-90 Thatcher, 
Conservative 
Growing search opportunism in PM’s own 
involvement in foreign affairs with, after 
1987, casual opportunism in macro-
economic policy 
Bruges speech and other anti-European 
initiatives capitalised on currents in 
Conservative public opinion, at increasing 
cost in negotiation capital in EEC relations 
Short term macro-economic policy: 
disguise of coping measure of shadowing 
Deutschmark as counter-inflation principle 
exposed when policy failed 
Declining enclaving 
but also increasingly 
isolate, with PM in 
structurally despotic 
position 
   
  24 
Table Two. Hypotheses: styles of opportunism expected in decision-making by 
elementary form of informal organisation among policymakers 
 
↑ Social regulation  
Isolate institutions 
Deep opportunism with respect to time 
and cost 
Shallow opportunism with respect to 
bias about probability of gains 
Some opportunism with respect to bias 
about size of gains 
Structural despot position: greater 
willingness than those in structural serf 
positions to engage in search or even in 
limited investment opportunism 
When objective adversities are more 
frequent or important than objective 
opportunities: may shift from over- to 
under-perceiving opportunities 
Hierarchical institutions 
Little opportunism 
When objective adversities are more 
frequent or important than objective 
opportunities: no adjustment of bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
→ Social 
integration Individualistic institutions 
Moderate opportunism only with 
respect to time and cost 
Where opportunism is cultivated, more 
likely to show depth with respect to bias 
about probability of gains than about 
size of gains 
Opportunism in context of negotiating 
opportunities 
When objective adversities are more 
frequent or important than objective 
opportunities: no impact on bias, 
remains resilient 
Enclaved institutions 
Normally, a principled rejection of 
opportunism. 
In moderately strong positive feedback 
and under perceived existential threat, 
may be deep opportunism with respect 
to time, shallow opportunism with 
respect to cost and deep opportunism 
with respect to bias about probability of 
gains 
When objective adversities are more 
frequent or important than objective 
opportunities: more likely to perceive 
existential threat and show 
opportunism 
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